An agency model of contracts used in California's processing-tomato industry is estimated in three stages. We first estimate growers' stochastic production possibilities, and then, for a given vector of preference parameters, compute an optimal compensation schedule. Finally, we compare computed compensations with actual compensations and choose preference parameters to minimise distance between the two. Assuming perfect competition and risk neutrality for processors, we obtain an estimate of 0.08 for growers' measure of constant absolute risk aversion, and find that growers who face higher-powered incentives produce higher levels of soluble solids, at a cost that is 1.8 per cent greater than otherwise. Efficiency losses from information constraints are 1 per cent of mean compensation, whereas existing quality measurement improves efficiency by 1.08 per cent.
Introduction
Theoretical study of contracts has progressed a great deal in recent years. Advances in this area have significantly improved our understanding of the role played by information constraints in shaping various kinds of market and non-market institutions. Unfortunately, attempts to test contract theories empirically, and to measure the magnitude of welfare losses arising from information constraints, remain scarce. Moreover, much of the evidence that has accumulated seems inconsistent with the trade-off between risk and incentives present in the standard principal-agent model (Prendergast, 1999) . This paper uses data from California's processing-tomato industry to estimate an agency model that captures the essential features of contracts between growers and processors in this industry.
1 Unlike most previous empirical work employing agency theory, our data are sufficiently rich to allow for non-parametric estimation of agents' (stochastic) production functions. 2 Using this estimated technology, we choose preference parameters (agent risk aversion and the cost of effort) to compute optimal compensation using the nonlinear program developed by Grossman and Hart (1983) . Finally, we perform a global search over feasible parameters to minimise distance between the computed and observed compensation schedules; the spirit of our exercise is similar to the investigation of executive compensation conducted by Haubrich and Popova (1998) .
We use the Grossman-Hart framework to obtain a complete characterisation of the efficient contract that does not impose any artificial, ad hoc restrictions on the predicted contract, and make rather minimal assumptions on technology and preferences. There are more general formulations of the principal-agent problem available; the main loss of generality in the GrossmanHart framework is the use of ex post lotteries to determine grower compensation, as in Myerson (1982) . In adopting the Grossman-Hart framework, we implicitly assume that grower compensation is a deterministic function of performance measures observed by the processor. Because ex post compensation lotteries are not a feature of the observed tomato contracts, we are fairly sanguine about this loss (but not entirely sanguine; it is possible that the efficient arrangement between grower and processor calls for lotteries in seldom-observed states of the world).
Despite ruling out the use of ex post lotteries, the Grossman-Hart framework is sufficiently general that one can typically find a set of preferences and technologies to rationalise any observed deterministic contract. The framework by itself imposes little structure on the efficient contract. An alternative approach to the study of contracts in the processing-tomato industry might be to assume that economic agents are somehow constrained to use the sort of piecewise linear contracts actually observed, and to use this structure to help in identifying technology and preferences. If, however, one regards the contract structure as an endogenous feature of the industry, then mistakenly treating these contracts as exogenous would lead to incorrect estimation and inference. In our view, the contract structure should not be pinned down by modelling assumptions. This structure should be determined only by exogenous primitives such as preferences and technology, with the observed form of the contract determined endogenously.
One might suppose from the preceding discussion that the Grossman-Hart framework is sufficiently general as to be unable to generate falsifiable predictions. If contract structure was all that we observed, then this would be more or less correct. Although the contract structure might suffice to identify preferences and technology, we would not have any additional restrictions with which to test the model. However, we also have data on production outcomes, which depend in part on the incentives offered to growers. By sharply limiting grower heterogeneity, we are able to use data on observed production outcomes under different contracts to independently estimate growers' stochastic production functions (actually treated as non-parametrically estimated probability distributions). Estimation is further simplified by taking advantage of a particular feature of the observed contracts: namely, that grower compensation does not depend on grower wealth. Perhaps surprisingly, this simple observation suffices to imply that grower utilities take a particular exponential form, with a single unknown parameter governing risk aversion.
In what follows, we briefly describe the tomato contracting environment that is the subject of our investigation. We then present a simple principalagent model that captures the essential features of this environment. In the next two sections we estimate the primitives of our model and conduct two counterfactual experiments: efficiency gains from removal of incentive constraints in the processor's contract design problem, and changes in expected quality when contracts are conditioned on only a single performance measure. The final section concludes.
Tomato contracting
Two important institutions exist in California that mediate exchange between growers and processors. The California Tomato Growers Association (CTGA) is a bargaining entity that negotiates contract terms with processors on behalf of member growers. Membership in this organisation fluctuates from year to year, but generally accounts for between 65 and 70 per cent of growers. The Processing Tomato Advisory Board (PTAB) performs thirdparty quality measurement and is jointly funded by processors and growers. All loads delivered by growers must be inspected at a certified PTAB grading station. In California, there are 25-30 processors who buy tomatoes in any given year, and each uses a unique contract with its growers. Contracts are based on crop area allocations and correspond to specific plots within each grower's total crop area. For growers who are CTGA members, there is also a 'master contract' that governs incentive structures and dispute resolution procedures. Although each processor's contract is unique, all tomato contracts have a similar structure. Compensation is awarded on the number of tons delivered and is adjusted based on the outcome of one or more quality measures. These include (primarily) colour, 'limited use', soluble solids, and various measures of damage (e.g. per cent worms, and per cent mould).
It is useful for future reference to represent a typical tomato contract formally. A piecewise linear function ðdÞ aggregates some vector of damage measures d into a percentage 'deduct' for each load of tomatoes. A base price b is then awarded on tomatoes before imposing this deduct, in addition to a premium that is computed with a piecewise linear schedule ðqÞ that depends on the outcome of the vector of quality measures q. Compensation w (per load) is then given by w ¼ ½1 À ðdÞ½b þ ðqÞ: Table 1 shows the deduct and premium schedules for the contract we estimate later in the paper. The contract conditions payment on only a single quality measure (soluble solids). Although the contracts of other processors have a similar structure, they vary widely in the specific deduct and premium parameters used, and in the quality measures that are employed. Interestingly, limited use sometimes shows up as both a quality measure and a damage measure (i.e., it enters compensation via ( . ) and ( . )). Also, although agricultural contracts seem a near-perfect example of a setting where relative performance incentives (e.g. 'tournaments') ought to be observed, these are used explicitly by only a single processor.
In the next section we briefly present a simple principal-agent model that will provide the basis for our estimation in the subsequent section. The model is derived from the work of Grossman and Hart (1983) , and permits fairly general specifications of both preferences and technology. Our aim is to see how we can use a rather general framework for modelling contract design, and to permit contractual form to be determined endogenously. We hope to find a particular specification of both preferences and technologies that delivers an efficient contract resembling the contracts we observe in the real world. If no such specification exists, then we would be led to reject models in the Grossman-Hart class. 
Model
Our model is of a processor and a single grower, and governs production and exchange of a single 'load' of tomatoes. For simplicity, we represent a load of tomatoes in two dimensions: one minus the fraction of damaged tomatoes r 2 R ½r 1 ; . . . ; r m (in Table 1 , r is one minus an aggregation of all 'deducts'), and some other quality attribute q 2 Q ½q 1 ; . . . ; q n (in Table 1 , q represents soluble solids). We let s ¼ ðr; qÞ represent the full vector of signals, and define S fðr; qÞjr 2 R; q 2 Qg to be the set of all possible realisations of s. The notation s ! s 0 has the usual component-wise interpretation. The processor is assumed to maximise expected profits, where the profit function depends on the quality of inputs according to some increasing and concave function Vðr; qÞ.
The grower's 'production technology' is represented as a conditional joint probability distribution over the production outcomes in S (Hart and Holmstro¨m, 1987) . In particular, s is treated as a (multivariate) random variable. The joint distribution of s is conditional on the grower's choice of action a 2 A ½a 1 ; . . . ; a k , assumed unobservable to the processor, and other production inputs that for notational simplicity we suppress. Although the processor cannot observe a directly, he or she may be able to infer something about its level by observing the realisation of signals s.
3 The probability of outcome s is denoted by pðsjaÞ > 0 with AE S pðsjaÞ ¼ 1 for all a 2 A. For action a and compensationŵ w, grower utility is given by some von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Hða;ŵ wÞ ¼ GðaÞ þ KðaÞUðŵ wÞ satisfying Assumption A1 in Grossman and Hart (1983) . Reservation utility for the grower is denoted by " U U. Let us denote compensation given a particular outcome s byŵ wðsÞ, and let uðsÞ ¼ Uðŵ wðsÞÞ. Then for any action a that is implementable, an efficient contract solves min fuðsjaÞjs 2 Sg X S pðsjaÞhðuðsjaÞÞ ð1Þ subject to
where h U À1 (see Grossman and Hart, 1983) . Because U( . ) is concave, h( . ) is convex and problem (1) is a simple nonlinear program with a convex objective function, and a finite number of linear constraints. Let CðaÞ denote the value of the objective function at the solution for action a. If for some a, there is no feasible solution, then we set CðaÞ ¼ À1; such an a is not implementable. The efficient a Ã is the one that maximises the expected value of Vðr; qÞ À CðaÞ, and the optimal wage schedule is obtained by computinĝ w wðsja Ã Þ ¼ hðuðsja Ã ÞÞ. In the empirical section that follows, we assume the grower chooses between two actions, A ¼ fa L ; a H g with a H > a L . Assuming the principal wishes to implement a H , it is straightforward to verify that a solution to problem (1) satisfies
where ! 0 and ! 0 are the Lagrange multipliers for the first and second constraints, respectively. Let us consider two possible outcomes s and s 0 s for the grower's vector of signals. Because h( . ) is a convex function, the grower receives higher utility in state s if and only if choosing a H increases the relative likelihood of observing s. That is, a contract will be monotonic if and only if pðsjaÞ satisfies (a vector-valued version of ) the monotone likelihood ratio property (Sinclair-Desgagne´, 1994) .
We know that the observed contract w is monotonic, which can be used as a restriction on our predicted contracts. Given some arbitrary technology p( . ), monotonicity could be imposed by adding an additional set of linear constraints to the problem (1) of the form uðsjaÞ ! uðs 0 jaÞ for s ! s 0 . However, if these constraints are binding, this suggests an important shortcoming in the basic model. A better alternative might be to solve (1) without additional constraints, and test whether the monotonicity restrictions are satisfied. Equation (2) makes clear that the grower's compensation is determined entirely by the informational content of the signals in s. In particular, the processor's objective function only determines which action is implemented, and therefore only has an indirect influence on the shape of the optimal compensation schedule.
Estimation
In this section we use data on quality outcomes for processing-tomato growers to estimate the likelihoods pðsja i Þ, i ¼ L, H, and preference parameters in Hða;ŵ wÞ. We then compare the optimal contract computed from problem (1) with the compensation schedule outlined in Table 1 .
The framework of Grossman and Hart (1983) that we use allows for a wide variety of preference structures. For the development of theory, this generality is appropriate. However, a simple, parametric cardinal utility function would greatly simplify the empirical exercise we engage in by reducing the size of the space of preference orderings to be considered. Fortunately, even before consulting data on outcomes, the form of the actual tomato contracts gives us a great deal of guidance. In particular, we note that the compensation awarded a grower for one load of tomatoes is independent of the consumption expenditures the same grower derives from other sources. If one assumes that quality and damage measures are conditionally independent across growers and add the natural assumption of a risk-neutral processor, 4 this independence, combined with equation (2), can easily be seen to imply that the grower's utility function is exponential in form and that quality outcomes for one load of tomatoes ought not to affect the compensation offered for another (whether the two loads are produced by the same or different growers), matching the arrangement we actually observe for most processors. Accordingly, we restrict the more general utility functions permitted by Grossman-Hart, taking the utility subfunctions GðaÞ ¼ 0, KðaÞ ¼ Àe Àa (choice of the exponent is made without loss of generality here, as it amounts to choosing the units a is measured in), and Uðŵ wÞ ¼ Àe Àŵ w , implying that Hða;ŵ wÞ ¼ Àe Àðŵ wÀaÞ , where is now interpreted as the grower's measure of constant absolute risk aversion (and where the units of a are the same as those forŵ w).
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To estimate the technology pðsjaÞ we assume all growers are identical, 6 and that they choose between two actions a L ¼ 0 and a H > 0. We use data collected from a processor who uses quality incentives, and from a processor who does not, and assume the processor using quality incentives induces a H for growers delivering under his contract. We interpret a H as the extra cost a grower incurs when producing under a contract with quality incentives.
Technology estimation
By assuming that the contract with incentives for solids induces all growers to take the action a H , whereas all growers without such incentives take the action a L , we are able to estimate the joint distribution of r and q separately from the growers' compensation schedule. Our data come from the PTAB of California (see Section 2), and consist of the measured quality attributes for each load of tomatoes delivered during the 1998 growing season. We consider a subset of this universe represented by all loads delivered either under the 4 Even if one were to doubt our assumption of competition in the tomato processing industry, the large tomato processors in our study are presumably essentially indifferent to risks on the scale of variation in compensation granted a single grower.
5 Note that this utility function is bounded above, but not below, and importantly that absolute risk aversion is constant. For these reasons and others, this is a popular choice of utility function in the literature on efficient contracts; see, e.g. Hart and Holmströ m (1987) , Holmströ m and Milgrom (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990) , and Haubrich and Popova (1998) .
6 With exponential utility, permitting idiosyncratic amounts of 'outside' income or wealth would have no effect on contract design. Other sorts of idiosyncratic variation in preferences or technology would, of course, have some effect. We use data on members of the California Tomato Growers Association, which is a self-selected group. If any member finds the collectively negotiated contract too unsuitable, they are free to negotiate a separate contract (and some growers do so). It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that this self-selected group does not differ too much in characteristics that would affect the design of the efficient contract.
contract outlined in Table 1 , or under the 'standard deducts' contract. We further restrict our sample by considering only loads delivered during a single month (to control for temporal variation in quality), and from the variety pool that is eligible for the contract in Table 1 (to control for the effect of variety selection on quality). With these data, we estimate the joint distribution of one minus total deductions r and soluble solids q, conditional on the equilibrium action for each contract (a H for the contract with quality incentives, and a L for the 'standard deducts' contract). For any s ðq; rÞ, we obtain an estimate of pðsja i Þ, i ¼ L, H, using a nonparametric kernel density estimator of the form
where the kernel K is the standard multivariate normal density function, and h is the bandwidth parameter (Silverman, 1986) . Observations corresponding to deliveries under the contract in Table 1 (n ¼ 2690) are used to estimate pðsja H Þ, whereas all other observations (n ¼ 2321) are used to estimate pðsja L Þ. Figure 1 displays estimated marginal quality distributions for growers delivering tomatoes under the contract in Table 1 and for growers delivering to processors who offer an identical 'deduct' schedule, but no soluble solids incentives. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote the marginal distribution for r by pðrjaÞ, and similarly for q. Quality incentives on q induce the expected shift in its marginal distribution, but also induce higher average r. This is not surprising given the structure of w: the expected return from higher r is greater for higher q. Figure 2 displays the estimated joint distribution of r and q for loads delivered to the processor who uses quality incentives.
From the previous section, we know that likelihood ratios are critical for determining the optimal compensation schedule. We denote the conditional likelihood ratio of r given some q by LðrjqÞ ¼ pðr; qja L Þ=pðr; qja H Þ, and similarly for q. Figure 3 presents these conditional likelihood ratios. As is apparent from the figure, the likelihood ratios associated with our estimated technology are not everywhere monotonic. This can lead to non-monotonicities in the efficient contract (although not necessarily). Also, r seems to be more informative as its conditional likelihood has greater variance (Kim, 1995) . It is noteworthy that all processors use r in their contracts, whereas only some processors use q.
Contract estimation
With an estimated technology in hand, we can now proceed to solve problem (1). We have three free parameters in our model: the grower's measure of constant absolute risk aversion , the cost of high effort a H , and the grower's reservation utility " U U. These latter two parameters cannot be separately identified, as both act on the grower's participation constraint in a similar fashion. We therefore set reservation utility " U U at À0.96, which is approximately equal to expected utility obtained under the no-incentives contract for a grower with ¼ 0:08.
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Estimation of the parameters and a H , and of the efficient contract, proceeds as follows: Let G ½s 1 ; . . . ; s m Â n represent a particular grid of possible outcomes for s. For example, with two possible outcomes for each signal, G ¼ ½ðq L ; r L Þ; ðq L ; r H Þ; ðq H ; r L Þ; ðq H ; r H Þ. Using the technology estimation procedure described in the previous section, we begin our contract estimation by obtainingp pðsja H Þ andp pðsja L Þ for all s 2 G. We then choose a parameter pair ð; a H Þ and solve the nonlinear program in equation (1) using our assumed exponential specification for grower preferences, and assuming only two possible actions, a H and a L , with the latter normalised to zero. This yields a predicted contractŵ wðsÞ for all s 2 G, representing the efficient incentive scheme for implementing action a H . The distance between this contract and the actual contract in Table 1 is computed as the mean-squared error between contracts for all s 2 G. Final estimates for our parameters and the efficient contract are the ones that minimise distance between predicted and actual contracts, and are obtained by searching over an equally spaced grid of parameter values.
In our sample m ¼ 31 and n ¼ 17. This makes 527 possible outcome states. Solving problem (1) for so many variables is not practicable. We therefore To be more precise, we first estimate and a restriction on the remaining parameters of the form f ð " U U; a H Þ ¼ 0. Using the estimated value of and assuming no other sources of income for the noincentives growers then suffices to separately identify " U U.
begin with only two outcomes for each quality measure, and then increase the number of possible outcomes to evaluate the sensitivity of our estimates to grid spacing. We put units in $100 per gross ton ($110.23 per gross metric ton) of tomatoes (a load of tomatoes amounts to roughly 50 tons). Evaluating the magnitude of our estimate for the grower's measure of constant absolute risk aversion is somewhat difficult. Few studies have attempted estimates of this coefficient. Nevertheless, our estimate of 0.08 translates into a coefficient of partial relative risk aversion of 0.041 (given expected compensation of 0.52). This estimate implies quite a low level of risk aversion for processing-tomato growers. Our estimate of effort cost translates into approximately $0.60 per ton over and above the costs borne by a producer who takes the low action. Average yields for processing-tomato growers are 35 tons per acre, so estimated cost per acre is approximately $21. So, put differently, producers who face incentives for soluble solids spend roughly 2 per cent more per acre than would a typical processing-tomato grower (May et al., 2001) . Table 2 reports parameter estimates when we use a finer grid for our outcome states. Our estimate of a H is somewhat variable, but in general the parameter estimates do not seem sensitive to grid spacing. In this table, we report estimates when the efficient contract is unconstrained, and when it is constrained to be monotonic (nonmonotonicities occurred with grid sizes three and five).
Figure 5 displays predicted and actual compensation schedules for a grid with four possible outcomes for each quality measure. As in Figure 4 , the model does well predicting compensation when both r and q are low, and when they are both high. The model does less well in intermediate ranges, and tends to underestimate the steepness (or 'power') of incentives. Estimation of the technology p( . ) could be carried out jointly with estimation of preferences, which could result in improved fit. In any case, given that the model is unable to match actual compensation more closely, it seems that some aspect of the chosen parameterisation is misspecified. An alternative interpretation is that some type of 'transaction cost' limits the processor's use of an optimal contract. Ferrall and Shearer (1999) adopt this interpretation and measure the magnitude of these transaction costs by computing the difference between expected surplus under optimal and actual contracts.
Agency costs and quality measurement
Having estimated our model, it is possible to conduct various interesting counterfactual exercises. We report the outcome of two such exercises in this section.
Agency costs
Private information constrains the set of contracts that are feasible. In particular, a full information contract in the environment we consider would not expose the grower to any risk. Using the parameter estimates obtained when m ¼ n ¼ 4, the grower would receive $51 per ton with certainty. The grower obtains the same expected utility under both the full and private information contracts. The welfare cost of private information is therefore given by the grower's risk premium under the private information contract, and this exactly equals the difference in expected compensation under the two contracts. For " U U ¼ À0:96 and ¼ 0:08, full information compensation is $51.03 per ton. Expected compensation under the private information contract is $51.55 per ton, yielding a welfare cost of $0.52 per ton. This yields a small welfare cost from private information of $5.6 million for the entire industry (total production in 1998 was 10.7 million tons).
There are two reasons why our estimate of this welfare cost probably is greatly biased downward. First, we have assumed there are only two actions: assuming the high action is implemented under both the full and private information contracts, there is no distortion in input decisions, so that losses are only due to the risk that is imposed on growers in the private information contract. Second, to simplify estimation of our model, we ignored an important element of the actual compensation schedule, namely, the fact that growers obtain no compensation when a load is rejected. Including this possibility adds substantial additional risk to growers' compensation. As a rough indication of how this might affect our estimate of welfare cost, let us suppose that growers face a 10 per cent chance of having any load rejected. Total operating costs for a load are roughly $36 per ton, which growers have to pay regardless of whether their load is rejected. Adding this amount (measured in units of $100) to our computed private information compensation schedule, and normalising pðr; qjaÞ to include a 10 per cent chance of rejection, an additional $8.6 per ton would have to be paid to achieve an expected utility of À0.96.
Adding this to our original estimate yields a total welfare cost of $9.12 per ton, which amounts to an industry-wide cost of $9.8 million. Although extremely rough, 8 this estimate suggests that welfare costs from private information could increase substantially when extreme penalties (which would not be necessary under full information) are considered.
Quality measurement
Performance measurement can be an extremely costly undertaking. In the processing-tomato industry, growers and processors combined pay roughly $0.30 per ton of tomatoes to PTAB (the charge is split evenly between the two parties and is assessed on a per-load basis), amounting to over $3 million dollars per year. With our estimated model we can evaluate quality improvements that result from this expenditure. One way to do this is simply by measuring the increase in expected quality that results when incentives are present. In our model, quality outcomes under the low action a L are obtained when there is no performance measurement with respect to q. For this action, Eðqja L Þ ¼ 6:204, and for the high action Eðqja H Þ ¼ 6:271, resulting in a 1.08 per cent increase. Similarly, r increases by 0.55 per cent from Eðrja L Þ ¼ 0:926 to Eðrja H Þ ¼ 0:931. These percentage increases seem small, but small increases in quality may well yield substantial benefit.
Conclusions
This paper estimates an agency model of contracting in California's processing-tomato industry. Quality outcomes for growers under contract are used to estimate outcome-state probabilities under two contracts: one that uses an explicit set of quality incentives for soluble solids, and another that does not. We presume that these two contracts implement different grower 'actions' and use the ratio of our estimated likelihoods as an estimate of the likelihood ratio that appears in our agency model. We then use the nonlinear program developed by Grossman and Hart (1983) to compute an optimal contract assuming constant absolute risk aversion for growers. We jointly estimate growers' risk aversion and the cost of high effort by minimising distance between computed and actual compensation schedules.
Assuming perfect competition and risk neutrality for processors, we obtain an estimate of 0.08 for growers' measure of constant absolute risk aversion, and find that growers who face higher-powered incentives produce higher levels of soluble solids, at a cost that is 1.8 per cent greater than it would be otherwise. Efficiency losses from information constraints are estimated at 1 per cent of mean compensation, whereas existing quality measurement improves efficiency (measured as a percentage increase in expected quality) by 1.08 per cent.
In addition to providing quantitative estimates of contracting costs (and benefits), our estimated model successfully replicates the broad features of the observed environment. On the technology side, when the grower makes higher investments, the distribution of damage and quality characteristics improves in the sense of exhibiting first-order stochastic dominance. On the contracting side, the model predicts that grower compensation ought to depend on both damage and quality measures, but that damage measures ought to play a dominant role in determining grower compensation, consistent with observed contracts. Furthermore, the model gets the signs right, predicting higher compensation for lower damage and higher quality. On the other hand, the model as specified does not match the magnitudes of the incentives offered by the observed contracts. In particular, the model predicts lower-powered incentives than are actually observed. Finally, levels of estimated grower risk aversion seem low relative to other estimates in the literature, although growers are certainly very far from being risk-neutral.
There are (at least) three possible sources of error that might account for the shortcomings of our estimated model. The first of these is sampling error. Although we have been able to compute point estimates for some of the key parameters of this model, it has not been computationally feasible to carry out any formal statistical inference. As a consequence, it is hard to decide on a statistical basis whether or not our specification of this model ought to be rejected, or whether the failures of the model might be due solely to sampling error in our observed production outcomes.
Setting sampling error aside, a second possible source of problems has to do with the particular identifying assumptions we have made to pursue this empirical exercise: that all growers are identical, save for possibly differing levels of initial wealth, and that the match between grower and processor reveals the unobserved actions taken by the grower. Given the first assumption, the second follows under mild assumptions as long as the match between grower and processor can be regarded as exogenous. None the less, tomato growers are in fact heterogeneous, and it would be much more satisfactory to be able to use observed grower characteristics to model the matching problem between grower and processor, and to regard unobserved (by the econometrician) grower characteristics as an important element determining action choice. This would lead to a model in which action choice, technology, and compensation schedules would all be estimated simultaneously. This simultaneity would increase the complexity of the estimation problem considerably. Given the current state of computational power, this may be feasible, but at present is left for future research.
There are other implicit assumptions that may be problematic. For example (as noted above), there are contractual provisions for rejecting loads, so that the grower receives no compensation at all. Our data do not include information on any such loads, which could lead to obvious problems in the estimation of the production technology (although there is anecdotal evidence that such rejections are very rare). In addition, although we permit growers to have other sources of income, we implicitly assume that these sources of income are not themselves risky. If this is mistaken, then our estimates of grower risk aversion will be flawed (suppose, for example, that growers find a way to hedge some of the risk associated with their contract; then they will appear to be less risk averse than they in fact are).
Finally, a more serious source of possible problems might have to do not with sampling error or the details of identifying assumptions, but rather with the basic assumption, implicit in the Grossman-Hart framework, that the only important source of friction is private information regarding grower actions, and that a tension between risk-sharing and the provision of incentives is the key to determining the structure of the efficient contract. However, in our view it takes a model to beat a model, and models incorporating other sources of friction have yet to be constructed and tested in this environment. Other possible avenues one might pursue include a model with transaction costs (e.g. as in Ferrall and Shearer, 1999) or hidden grower types. Although possibly worth considering, we are pessimistic about the ability of either of these kinds of frictions to deliver models that perform better than the one we have estimated here. A model with transaction costs would tend to predict much higher-powered incentives than are actually observed, and a model with unobserved types seems at odds with the learning that presumably takes place in the repeated relationships we observe in the processing-tomato industry.
